Abstract: This study examines the demobilization of the Ogoni protest campaign in the oil producing Niger Delta region of Nigeria in the mid-1990s. The contentious politics literature suggest that protest campaigns demobilize as a consequence of the polarization between radical and moderate protesters. In this study, we offer a different causal mechanism and argue that protest campaigns can demobilize before such indiscriminate repression. Moreover, states can prevent the subsequent radicalization of a protest campaign followed by harsh repression by coopting the radicals and the remaining moderate elites while continuing to use repression to prevent collective action. Our conclusion assesses how relations between extractive industry firms and their local host communities have or have not changed in the twenty years since the hanging of Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995.
Introduction
On January 4, 1993, around 300,000 Ogoni people in Rivers State, Nigeria peacefully protested against the environmental devastation of their land caused by the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC), the Nigerian subsidiary of Royal Dutch/Shell (hereafter, Shell). These protests, under the leadership of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) also expressed the Ogoni peoples' right to self-determination, including greater control over the exploitation of the natural resources (oil) found on their lands. The protest campaign succeeded in securing both mass and international support, and it lasted more than two years under a highly repressive military dictatorship. The campaign demobilized rapidly when the Nigerian military dictatorship executed the leader of the protest campaign, Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni leaders on November 10, 1995.
This study examines the dynamics of the demobilization of the Ogoni protest campaign.
We argue that government's brutal and indiscriminate repression of moderate, nonviolent activists and its subsequent cooptation of the remaining opposition prevented the protest campaign from diffusing widely to different oil-producing communities and going through an upscale shift. Typically, social movement scholars argue that protest campaigns demobilize as a consequence of the polarization between radical and moderate protesters. In this study, we offer a different causal mechanism and argue that protest campaigns can demobilize before such polarization occurs if states respond to the expansion of a protest campaign with brutal and indiscriminate repression. Moreover, social movement scholars also contend that the brutal repression of nonviolent tactics usually leads to the radicalization of protest campaigns. Here, we demonstrate that states can prevent this radicalization from becoming a major challenge by coopting the radicals and leading moderate elites while continuing to repress the bulk of the moderates.
To examine the demobilization of the Ogoni protest campaign, we employ McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly's (2001) Dynamics of Contention framework. As discussed below, this framework is designed to identify crucial relational mechanisms and processes that shape the trajectory of campaigns by breaking the processes of specific campaigns down into their constituent mechanisms. A major advantage of using this framework is that it takes the contingent and endogenous aspects of protest campaigns into account while simultaneously allowing for the identification of common mechanisms that shape various processes of protest campaigns.
We therefore investigate the mechanisms that were at play in the mid-1990s Ogoni campaign and examine how certain mechanisms were critical in explaining the demobilization process. Even though our focus is on the demobilization of the campaign, we also look at the mechanisms throughout the mobilization phase in order to understand better the point at which demobilization began (Tarrow 1998 ). If we can understand the dynamics of the expansion of the Ogoni campaign and pinpoint the turning point in which the campaign changed course and began to demobilize, we can identify the mechanisms (or their lack of) that triggered this change more effectively.
The examination of the Ogoni protest campaign, therefore, contributes to the literature in three major ways. First, this study contributes to the literature on extractive industries and the "resource curse" by focusing on the emergence and subsequent demobilization of one of the most effective non-violent indigenous protest movements seeking to change the political economy and environmental impacts of oil production the world has yet seen. The January 4, 1993 mass protests across Ogoniland remain the largest peaceful demonstrations ever held against an oil company and the Ogoni claim to be "the first indigenous people in the history of our planet to force a transnational oil company to leave our land by peaceful means" (Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People 1998). There is a vast, growing and valuable literature on the Ogoni more specifically and the Niger Delta more generally which touches on many themes closely related to the focus of this study. Numerous studies have assessed the Ogoni or Niger Delta self-determination claims (Ejobowah 2000 , Osaghae 1995 , Senewo 2015 while Frynas (2001) convincingly highlights some of the corporate and state responses to the protests we emphasize in this study. A number of studies have highlighted the corporate role in violence and human rights violations against the oil-producing communities (Manby 1999 , Pegg 1999 Ukiwo's (2007) work on how the turn toward militancy is specifically connected to a consistent failure to meet peaceful demands is particularly relevant for some of the arguments advanced in this study. None of these studies, however, have employed a contentious politics framework to study the demobilization of a resource-focused non-violent protest movement or examine how resource abundance shapes the response of states and other external actors to protests by oil-producing communities. In doing this with the Ogoni campaign, we seek to address Obi's (2014:148) critique that "explanations of conflict in oil-rich contexts should be more nuanced, historically-rooted and context-specific."
Second, this study examines the dynamics of demobilization which have traditionally been understudied in the contentious politics literature. Most studies on protests focus on factors that contribute to the emergence or the expansion of the scale and scope of protest activities (Koopmans 1997 , McAdam 1983 , McAdam, et al. 2001 , Tarrow 1998 , Tilly 1978 . Third, it offers a different understanding of the effects of repression and accommodation on the demobilization of a protest campaign. Scholars have shown that states usually repress radicals and accommodate moderates to increase the cost of violent collective action. However, the demobilization of the Ogoni campaign shows that states can also brutally repress the moderates and, subsequently, coopt the radicals and some moderate elites, leading to the campaign's demobilization.
The reminder of this study comprises five main sections. First, we lay out the conceptual foundations of demobilization by explaining the main components of the Dynamics of Contention (McAdam, et al. 2001 ) framework and highlighting the specific causal mechanisms advanced in this study. Second, we explain McAdam et al.'s (2001) mechanisms and processes framework and highlight the specific mechanisms and processes we believe are particularly relevant in the Ogoni case. Third, before proceeding to the analysis, we provide a brief case study background on Ken Saro-Wiwa, MOSOP and the Ogoni campaign. Fourth, our analysis section (presented in four parts) examines the Ogoni protest campaign by dissecting it into the relevant mechanisms and processes and identifying why the campaign demobilized. Finally, in our concluding section, we discuss the theoretical and practical implications of our findings.
Demobilization from a Dynamic Perspective
In this study, we refer to demobilization as a decrease in the scale and scope of protest activity (Tarrow 1998:147) . Demobilization does not necessarily mean that protest activity comes to a complete halt; but it does mean that campaign activity slows down, its resources decline and its potential to challenge the state diminishes significantly.
Demobilization is a process as it involves sequences of interactions among actors, including campaign leaders, activists, the mass public and the state. Among the few scholars that have studied demobilization, Tarrow (1989) and della Porta and Tarrow (1986) argue that it is the inevitable outcome of the expansion of a protest campaign and is largely driven by the polarization between the moderates and radicals within the campaign. When protest campaigns first emerge, disruptive protests diffuse to different locations and segments of the society.
Competition for mass support intensifies as both established groups, such as trade unions or political parties, and new groups join the campaign. In the meantime, the early enthusiasm for protesting wanes over time and the personal costs of participation begin to wear people down.
The decline in participation further encourages group competition for mass support. While moderates lead the shift toward more conventional forms of collective action such as strikes and demonstrations, smaller and newer groups turn radical as they employ violent tactics in an attempt to distinguish themselves from the moderates. The state begins to repress the radicals selectively while accommodating the moderates, reinforcing the polarization between these groups. Faced with repression, the radicals resort to more violent tactics, resulting in a further withdrawal of public support. The split between institutionalization and radicalization eventually leads to the end of the protest campaign (Tarrow 1989 ).
We, however, offer an alternative causal path to demobilization. We argue that if the state brutally represses the moderates even before a significant polarization between the radicals and the moderates emerges, the state deters the moderates and demobilizes the campaign. After repressing the moderates, the state can also circumvent any attempts by the radicals to start a violent campaign by coopting them. Moreover, while the state continues to repress the moderates, it also coopts some remaining nonviolent elites to prevent any future mobilization. In other words, in this study, we demonstrate that the brutal repression of moderates can be an effective strategy for the state to employ in order to demobilize a campaign, particularly if it is coupled with the cooptation of some moderate leaders and the violent radicals that emerge in its aftermath.
The causal mechanism we offer contrasts with other mechanisms advanced in the literature on protest campaigns. Several studies have shown that the repression of nonviolent protesters has a potential to "backfire" as repression delegitimizes the state and motivates more people to join the nonviolent campaign (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011 , Francisco 1995 , Rasler 1996 . Alternatively, protesters substitute nonviolent tactics with violent ones when repression increases the cost of nonviolent collective action (Lichbach 1987) . Furthermore, repression can also have a long term escalatory effect even if it initially deters protests by imposing costs on collective action. The deterrent effect of the repression of nonviolent protests can be neutralized, or even reversed, if protesters are directly exposed to repression, are members of informal associations such as unions or churches and perceive repression to be illegitimate. As a result of their interactions with other activists who believe that violence is the only option left to oppose the state, protesters might join more radical groups and continue to challenge the state through more violent means, a process referred to as "micromobilization" (White 1989) . Finally, accommodation of the opposition is likely to increase mass action as it signals that the opposition has a chance to succeed (Rasler 1996) . In contrast to these studies that emphasize the escalatory effects of repression and accommodation, we maintain that repression can also lead to the demobilization of a nonviolent protest campaign under three specific conditions: 1) if repression is applied before nonviolent protests diffuse widely to other localities and go through an upscale shift; 2) if repression is extremely brutal; and 3) if the potential escalatory effects of brutal repression are bypassed by the cooptation of the radicals and some moderate leaders. Therefore, we demonstrate that states can effectively avoid the backfire effect of repression even if the campaign remains overwhelmingly nonviolent, and further circumvent the escalation of the campaign by pulling radicals into mainstream politics or simply paying them off. Without a backfire effect from repression and without the escalation of violence, the campaign then demobilizes.
So, why are the backfire, substitution, micromobilization or accommodation mechanisms not triggered in this particular case? We believe that the answer to this question lies in the dynamic, endogenous, and complex nature of protest campaigns which we examine by employing McAdam, et al.'s (2001) Dynamics of Contention framework. This framework is based on dissecting contention into relational mechanisms and processes and identifying which mechanisms, singlehandedly or in combination with others, shape contentious processes. Accordingly, relational mechanisms are causal mechanisms that alter relations among people, groups, and interpersonal networks, while processes refer to politically contentious actions that are transformative and have large scale consequences (McAdam, et al. 2001, Rasler forthcoming) . In examining the dynamics of the Ogoni protest campaign, we specifically treat relational mechanisms as the links between large scale transformations or processes such as mobilization and demobilization.
Processes: Mobilization, Coalition Formation, Upscale Shift, and Demobilization
Demobilization is contingent on earlier processes of contention: a protest campaign demobilizes only after it mobilizes. Therefore, we need to look at how mobilization evolves and the mechanisms that shape the upswing phase of a protest campaign in order to understand better when and how demobilization begins.
Contentious politics scholars have often identified the sequence of processes throughout the upswing phase of protest campaigns as mobilization, coalition formation, and upscale shift (della Porta and Tarrow 1986 , Koopmans 1993 , McAdam, et al. 2001 , Rasler forthcoming, Tarrow 1989 . Mobilization is an increase in the resources available to groups for collective action (Tilly and Tarrow 2007:217) . Typically, an existing organization initiates protest activity and seeks to attract more participants. As participation increases, protests diffuse to other groups incorporating previously distinct actors such as students, peasants, workers, elites, or women's groups, which is the coalition formation process. Coalition formation is the creation of coordinated action between two or more previously distinct actors (Tilly and Tarrow 2007:216) .
As groups continue to mobilize and build coalitions, protests then diffuse to new geographical sites and new actors, elevating the scale of protests, which is the upscale shift process (Tilly and Tarrow 2007:217) .
Theoretically, campaigns can demobilize either right after the initial mobilization, after the process of coalition formation, or after the process of upscale shift. Most scholars who have studied demobilization have examined cases where mobilization and coalition formation led to a major upscale shift, expanding protests to a large number of people at various locations (Piven and Cloward 1977, Tarrow 1989) . For Piven and Cloward (1977) , the disruptive and unpredictable nature of mass protests forces governments to make concessions to the protesters in an attempt to coopt them. Once protests become more institutionalized, the early enthusiasm decreases and the campaign demobilizes. For Tarrow (1989) , the competition for mass support among the newly incorporated groups leads to the emergence of radical groups during the upscale shift process. The polarization between the radicals and the moderates during the upscale shift is followed by demobilization.
In the Ogoni case, demobilization took place after the coalition building process. In other words, the campaign demobilized before sustained protests spread widely to other locations in the Niger Delta (isolated or sporadic protests occurred in other areas of the Niger Delta both before and during the Ogoni mobilization) and before a radical wing emerged among the protesters (in some senses, the National Youth Council of the Ogoni People (NYCOP) was the radical wing of MOSOP but it remained largely nonviolent and did not split from MOSOP). In the context of the Ogoni protest campaign, we examine four relational mechanisms and their effects on demobilization: certification, brokerage, repression, and cooptation. We demonstrate that certification and brokerage intensified the mobilization and coalition building processes, but the combination of repression and cooptation triggered the process of demobilization before an upscale shift could occur. Certification is an external authority's signal of its readiness to recognize and support the existence and claims of a political actor (Tilly and Tarrow 2007:215) . Certification can come from a variety of different sources. It could potentially come from an intergovernmental organization which adopts or highlights the issue(s) the campaign is raising. It could come from the domestic government or elements within it granting legitimacy to some of the protesters' demands. It might also come from the diplomatic support of a foreign government or it could result from the campaigning or advocacy work of a domestic or international non-governmental organization (NGO).
Brokerage refers to the production of a new connection between previously unconnected or weakly connected sites (Tilly and Tarrow 2007:215) . In contrast to certification which merely bestows some degree of legitimacy on the protesters' demands, brokerage involves previously disparate groups beginning to work together on the same campaign. As with certification, though, brokerage can happen in a variety of different ways. Hypothetically, an environmental movement could enlist the support of a labor union in promoting its cause or vice versa. A protest movement initiated by students could secure more active support from middle class professionals. Brokerage can also operate transnationally as a campaign in one country picks up active support from NGOs in other countries.
Repression is any action by authorities that increases the actual or potential cost of an actor's claim making (Tilly and Tarrow 2007:15) . Repression can range from the imposition of curfews or restrictions on gatherings to selective arrests of leaders or mass arrests of protesters to the use of varying levels of violence against the protesters or their leaders.
Cooptation is the incorporation of a previously excluded political actor into some center of power (Tilly and Tarrow 2007:215) . Cooptation is a mechanism which states typically use to tame or moderate potential rivals by enabling them to benefit directly from the existing political system. Even before MOSOP was officially launched, "the seminal document in the Ogoni struggle" (Bob 2005:64) , the Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR) was adopted on August 26, 1990 (see Senewo, this volume for more on the OBR). Largely written by Saro-Wiwa, the OBR asserted the long-standing historical grievances of the Ogoni people, highlighted their distinct lack of benefits from oil production, and noted some of the adverse environmental and social consequences of oil production on their land. The OBR's main posited remedy for these ailments was that the Ogoni people "be granted POLITICAL AUTONOMY to participate in the affairs of the Republic as a distinct and separate unit by whatever name called" with political autonomy defined as including "the right to the control and use of a fair proportion of OGONI economic resources for Ogoni development," better representation in Nigerian national institutions, environmental protection and linguistic, cultural and religious rights (all caps in original) (Ogoni
Bill of Rights 1990/1991).
Dissatisfied with the lack of response to their demands in the OBR, in December 1991, the Ogoni adopted an addendum to the OBR that authorized MOSOP "to make representation, for as long as these injustices continue, to… all international bodies which have a role to play in the preservation of our nationality" (Ogoni Bill of Rights 1990 /1991 . Convinced that the Nigerian government lacked the ability or will to solve the problem, Saro-Wiwa began to seek international support (Saro-Wiwa 1995:131-32 A number of features of the MOSOP-led Ogoni protest campaign in the early-mid 1990s contributed to its popularity among the Ogonis as well as various international actors and, in some cases, made it seem more threatening to the oil companies and the Nigerian state. First, the Ogoni campaign was theoretically conceived and overwhelmingly practiced as a peaceful, nonviolent campaign. Saro-Wiwa studied Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. and sincerely believed that non-violent protest was the most effective option available to the Ogoni. MOSOP protests were often led by women marching in front to signal non-violence and featured protesters carrying twigs or leaves to show that they were unarmed. This is not to suggest that Ogonis never used violence. Rather, it is to suggest, in Bob's (2005:106) phrasing that "although some Ogonis used violence, these unusual events contravened MOSOP policy and were quickly condemned by the leadership." The nonviolent nature of the campaign increased its popularity as people are more likely to participate and commit to nonviolent campaigns as opposed to violent ones, which require a higher level of commitment (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011 Referencing this language, Saro-Wiwa subsequently argued that "Only an idiot or a man fishing for trouble could ever construct those words as secessionist" (Saro-Wiwa 1995:154) . The goal of self-determination as opposed to secession was another factor that contributed to the campaign's popularity as it did not suggest the enormous suffering that Nigerians associated with the secessionist Biafran civil war.
Third, over time, the relatively heavy emphasis on political autonomy within Nigeria in the OBR was increasingly augmented by an emphasis on environmental rights and Ogoni suffering due to environmental degradation. The environmental impacts of oil exploration and production are significant and varied. They include clearing land for seismic operations, disposing of drilling waste, oil spills and the production of greenhouse gases from gas flaring.
Environmental impacts can also occur both long before production starts and long after it ends (Frynas 2000 , Manby 1999 , United Nations Environmental Program 2011 . Throughout the course of the campaign, the environmental aspects of the campaign received increased attention and support, particularly from international NGOs (Bob 2005:80-90) with Saro-Wiwa ultimately arguing that for the Ogoni people, "the environment is their first right and the struggle for it takes precedence over all else" (Saro-Wiwa 1995:169).
Fourth, an innovative aspect of the Ogoni campaign was the way in which its selfdetermination claims were directed simultaneously at the Nigerian state and at the transnational oil companies operating in Nigeria (Saro-Wiwa 1995:80). Ultimately, this belief earned widespread acceptance throughout the Niger Delta, contributing to the popularity of the protest movement but also adding to the oil companies' fear of it. As Omeje explains, "In the minds and reckoning of a large section of the local people, there is hardly any distinction between the oil industry and the state. The two are perceived as one and the same entity" (Omeje 2005:328) .
Most self-determination movements direct their claims solely at sovereign governments. In the Ogoni case, such claims were always directed both at the state and at the oil companies.
Finally, the Ogoni self-determination claims were also pitched in terms of "resource control" which made such claims particularly threatening to the Nigerian state. Compared to some of the subsequent demands that have been made, the OBR puts this demand forward somewhat mildly as "The right to the control and use of a fair proportion of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni development" (Ogoni Bill of Rights 1990/1991). The addendum to the OBR subsequently increases the specificity of this demand to using "at least fifty per cent of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni development" (Ogoni Bill of Rights 1990/1991). Demands for resource control are often incorrectly equated with demands to increase the share of revenues allocated to the states that produced or generated them under the so-called derivation principle.
At independence, the derivation principle was set at 50% of the tax revenues derived from that area. This was subsequently lowered to 45% and then to 20% before being entirely abolished and replaced with a special account for oil-producing areas which ultimately hit a low of 1.5% in 1992. Under Nigeria's current constitution, the derivation principle has been increased to 13% (Frynas 2001:32-39) . While the 13% formula is seemingly an improvement, under Nigeria's legislative and constitutional framework, all sub-soil resources belong to the federal government and are controlled by it.
Yet, as Ihonvbere (2000:358) has correctly noted, "The debate in the oil-bearing communities of Nigeria has long gone beyond percentages to one of control." More specifically, the oil-producing communities are not asking that control and ownership of the natural resources on their land be given to state governments. As Manby (1999:49) observes, under the current 13% revenue allocation formula, "it is not clear that the allocation would directly benefit the communities in which the oil is produced, rather than the state governments in the oil producing areas, where the money would likely be used for patronage rather than development." Thus, the Ogoni demand for resource control is a demand for community ownership and control of the natural resources found on their lands (Osaghae 1995:340-41) . It is thus not surprising that oil companies used to dealing with one Nigerian federal government or that government which depends upon oil for about 80% of its total revenues and 95% of its foreign exchange earnings (United Nations Environmental Program 2011:20) would find such a demand revolutionary and unacceptable.
The Ogoni Mobilization Process and the Certification Mechanism
A crucial mechanism in enabling the Ogoni campaign to achieve traction and grow rapidly was certification by outside actors. Certification refers to an external authority's signal of its readiness to recognize and support the existence and claims of a political actor. Another key strategy that Saro-Wiwa employed to reach out effectively to the Ogoni masses was to speak to them in their own local languages and dialects. One NGO mission visiting Ogoni noted "That he made the effort to learn to speak the various Ogoni languages, an apparently unusual characteristic for Ogoniland leaders, has impressed many people" (Boele 1995:11) .
A final good example of the kind of coalition formation that MOSOP sought to pursue comes from the establishment of the One Naira Ogoni Survival Fund (ONOSUF). At the time it was established in 1993, one Naira was worth approximately 4.5 US cents. Thus, this campaign was not about fundraising. Rather, it was about securing participation from as many people as possible. In Saro-Wiwa's explanation, "In establishing this fund, we want to emphasize not money but the symbols of togetherness, of comradeship, of unity of endeavor…." By contributing to ONOSUF, Ogoni men, women and children would make "a statement of their wish to survive as individuals and as one indivisible nation" (Saro-Wiwa 1995:150) .
No Upscale Shift: The Mechanisms of Brokerage and Repression
After the mass demonstration of strength in January 1993, the MOSOP campaign was further bolstered by the mechanism of brokerage, particularly in terms of internationalizing the struggle. Brokerage involves making new or stronger connections between previously unconnected or disparate groups (Tilly and Tarrow 2007:215) . In the Ogoni case, Ken SaroWiwa effectively linked human rights violations to environmental issues, a now unremarkable argument but one that was a major conceptual innovation in the early 1990s. Saro-Wiwa did this by playing the "Shell card" (Bob 2005:81) other oil companies and express similar grievances to those enunciated by the Ogoni (Crow 1995 ). Yet, the "high handed response of the state to peaceful protest" (Obi 2014:150) and its brutal repression within Ogoni through the use of "unlawful and disproportionate force" (Crow 1995) prevented any possible diffusion of sustained protests to those or other communities.
The Process of Demobilization and the Mechanisms of Repression and Cooptation
Aware of his critical role as an effective leader in mobilizing the Ogoni, the state directly While Saro-Wiwa and the MOSOP leadership were being targeted, the student and the youth wings continued to hold peaceful demonstrations. The state responded violently to these protests, killing hundreds of Ogoni activists and torturing those who were arrested (Cooper 1999) . At the same time, the state targeted Ogoni communities by razing villages, raping women and indiscriminately killing people. For much of 1993-1995, Ogoni was essentially under military occupation with the region almost entirely sealed off from outsiders. Estimates suggest that more than 2,000 Ogoni civilians were killed from 1993-1995 (Pegg 1999:474) . Such Ogoni civilians were killed both in small numbers at oil-related protests at such locations as Biara (April 1993) and Korokoro (October 1993) (Pegg 1999:476-77) and in much larger numbers through military attacks staged to appear as if they were communal violence between the Ogoni and some of their neighbors including the Andoni (July 1993), the Okrika (December 1993) and the Ndoki (April 1994) (Crow 1995) . Human Rights Watch noted that the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force "reportedly raided at least sixty towns and villages in Ogoniland" and that during the summer of 1994 the "raids reportedly became almost a nightly occurrence" (Crow 1995) . One former MOSOP activist explained to the authors that rape had lost its stigma in
Ogoni because so many women had been raped. Human Rights Watch reported that "soldiers raped young and old women alike in the course of raids on Ogoni villages" and concluded that "the rapes were both punitive and discriminatory because they occurred in the course of organized raids on Ogoni villages alone" (Crow 1995) .
The Nigerian state's brutal response toward the Ogoni communities and the execution of Saro-Wiwa discouraged activism and mass protests in the Niger Delta after 1995 (Bob 2005:105) . Even though activism expanded between 1993 and 1995 as other minorities sharing similar political, environmental and economic grievances emulated MOSOP strategies by issuing their own bills of rights, harsh repression prevented the coordination of protests across the Niger Delta which might have elevated the pressure on the government and the oil companies to change their policies.
The timing and the brutal nature of repression, therefore, played a crucial role in triggering the demobilization of the campaign instead of leading to a "backfire effect" which is what happens when nonviolence is repressed and more nonviolent protesters join the protests (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011 , Francisco 1995 , Rasler 1996 . The Nigerian state responded forcefully to the increased mobilization in Ogoni in order to prevent the widespread diffusion of protests to other oil-producing communities in the Niger Delta. A backfire effect might have been possible if protests had already spread significantly to other communities because the military would not have been able to respond with such sustained and concentrated force over a much wider geographical area. Moreover, if other oil-producing communities had also quickly joined the protests and effectively shut down oil production, the Nigerian state would have suffered tremendous economic losses. So, the Nigerian state acted before the protests diffused widely and acted brutally to prevent any potential increase in the scale and scope of the protests.
So, one part of our argument is that the harshness, severity and comprehensiveness of the Nigerian state's repression of non-violent protests explains why there was no backfire effect where the repression of non-violent protests leads to their growth and diffusion as more nonviolent protesters join the movement. The contentious politics literature, however, suggests another way in which the repression of non-violent campaigners might also lead to an increase in the intensity of a protest campaign. This is the mechanism of escalation which occurs when nonviolence is repressed and activists switch to violent means (Lichbach 1987) . In particular, micromobilization models suggest that even though repression deters nonviolent protests initially, its deterrent effect is neutralized, or even reversed, if people are directly exposed to repression and are members of informal associations such as unions or churches that are supportive of protests (McAdam 1988 , Opp and Roehl 1990 , White 1989 . For people to engage in political violence, they must perceive repression to be illegitimate and expect others to do so, anticipating their support for organized violence because of the belief that it is a viable option (White 1989) . The shift to political violence may not happen immediately as micromobilization processes take time. However, as support for political violence grows, a repressed nonviolent campaign ultimately escalates into a violent campaign (White 1989 ).
To some extent, there was escalation or a preference shift from non-violent to violent tactics in the Niger Delta after Saro-Wiwa's hanging in 1995. The authors have personally witnessed a number of Ogoni activists confronted by others with some variant of the question "what did your non-violent protests get you?" with the proclaimed answer being some variant of "it got your villages razed, your leaders killed and your women raped." While the turn toward militancy in the Niger Delta over the past 15-20 years is often ascribed simplistically to greed or the desire for personal enrichment on the part of the militants, a more compelling explanation is the perceived failure of non-violent methods of collective action. In a careful study of the rise of militancy among the Ijaw in and around Warri, Delta State, Ukiwo (2007) argues that communities turned to violence only after the repeated failure of the oil companies to respond to petitions and other peaceful or constitutional forms of demand. Ijaw communities learned that the same companies that blithely ignored peaceful protests "responded speedily, under threat of violence and 'direct action,' to community demands" (Ukiwo 2007:609) . The end result of this is that "Ijaw youths have come to realize that the only language government and oil companies understand is violence" (Ukiwo 2007:609) . Ikelegbe (2001:459) This analysis also shows that cooptation can be a successful mechanism to avoid the potential escalatory effects of repression. By providing financial incentives to the militants and by incorporating several moderate activists into the government, the state effectively found at least a temporary solution to its problem of militant-induced declining oil production. Second, this study shows that analyzing contention by examining the mechanisms and the larger processes that are at play facilitates a better understanding of the dynamics of the case at hand. In this case, we were able to identify where within the trajectory of the Ogoni protest movement the campaign started to demobilize and why. Moreover, we showed how mechanisms that are influential in the mobilization process, like brokerage and certification, can also be important factors in a movement's demobilization by alerting the state to the growing influence of the campaign. Therefore, this study shows that mechanisms might have different effects at different points in time over the course of a protest campaign. The occurrence of one mechanism changes what happens next and how the overall processes play out.
Twenty years after Ken Saro-Wiwa's hanging, it is remarkable both how much and how little has changed in terms of the extractive industries. A few years after his execution, in 1997, Shell became the first major energy company to declare publicly its support for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The following year, Shell became one of the first extractive firms to address human rights issues explicitly in an annual report on the firm's financial, social and environmental performance. Idemudia (2014:157) Saro-Wiwa's hanging than they were before it.
On the other hand, the most comprehensive environmental assessment yet done in the Niger Delta recently found that "clean-up efforts by SPDC… are not leading to environmental restoration nor legislative compliance, nor even compliance with its own internal procedures"
(United Nations Environmental Program 2011:135). Idemudia (2014:160) notes here that "the compartmentalization of CSR obligations by focusing almost exclusively on affirmative duties (i.e., social investments) while being silent on negative injunction duties (e.g., questions of oil pollution incidence and compensation payments)" means that core community concerns such as environmental degradation and compensation for it "are often not addressed." SPDC's initial offer of assistance to an Ogoni community of more than 60,000 people whose mangrove forests, Ken Saro-Wiwa is gone but his ideas on self-determination, political autonomy and resource control continue to animate political demands in the Niger Delta today. Yet, these demands are now often put forward by violent militant groups or cynical and rapacious state governors. In contrast to its brutal repression of Ogoni villagers, the Nigerian state has largely chosen to coopt and buy off the militants. That strategy has produced a temporary calm in the Niger Delta but one whose costs cannot be sustained indefinitely. There is as yet no denouement in the Niger Delta because none of the larger issues raised by Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni campaign have been substantively addressed.
